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The role of the artefact in art and design research 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper opens with the definition of research made by the Arts and Humanities Research Board of the UK. 
This states that art and design research must advance knowledge, understanding and insight. The paper goes on 
to consider the role of the artefact in communicating this advancement, and whether artefacts have the 
capability to embody knowledge. Comparisons are made with archaeological and other museum exhibits, and 
criticisms of embodiment from museological studies are compared with claims for embodiment made by 
artists. The conclusion is that interpretation is a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, and that in 
order to communicate effectively control must be exercised over the extrinsic factors by providing a context. 
Although commonly achieved through words, this is owing to the utility of words for explicatory purposes 
rather than because words have primacy over objects in art and design research. It is therefore the content 
rather than the form of this context that is important. 
 
Paper 
 
In this paper I shall discuss one consequence of a short but important statement in the 
UK Arts and Humanities Research Board’s definition of research: 
The AHRB1 definition of research provides a distinction between research and practice 
per se. Creative output can be produced, or practice undertaken, as an integral part of 
a research process... but equally, creativity or practice may involve no such process at 
all, in which case they would be ineligible for funding from the Board. 
There are two elements to this statement. The first is the distinction between research and 
practice. The second is the grounds for that distinction based on certain defining 
characteristics of research. AHRB identifies three groups of characteristics: 
• It must define a series of research questions that will be addressed or problems 
that will be explored in the course of the research. It must also define its objectives in 
terms of answering those questions or reporting on the results of the research project. 
• It must specify a research context for the questions to be addressed or problems to 
be explored. You must specify why it is important that these particular questions 
should be answered or problems explored; what other research is being or has been 
conducted in this area; and what particular contribution this particular project will 
make to the advancement of knowledge, understanding and insights in this area. 
• It must specify the research methods for addressing and answering the research 
questions. You must state how, in the course of the research project, 
 
you are going to set about answering the questions that have been set, or ex-
ploring the matters to be explored. You should also explain the rationale for 
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your chosen research methods and why you think they provide the most ap-
propriate means by which to answer the research questions. 
I shall use these groups to make a distinction between practice and research. 1 shall 
refer to them broadly as ‘questions and answers’, ‘context’ and ‘methods’. Much 
attention has been given to the third characteristic of ‘methods’ in a recent debate about 
research in art and design.2 However, the principal feature of such research is not the 
employment of a particular method but the desire or requirement to create artefacts and 
to present them as part of the ‘answer’. In this way, art and design research is different 
from many other disciplines because it does not simply use objects as evidence, which 
is later, reported on, but attempts to present these objects as an argument for 
interpretation by the viewer. This implies the notion that the artefact can embody the 
answer to the research question and this is the problem that is addressed in this paper. 
 
The first characteristic, ‘question and answer’, does not sit well with art and design. 
Although the practitioner may set some particular problem as a motivation to work in 
the studio, most creative activity seeks to problematise that which is familiar, or to 
raise questions or issues rather than to answer them. Outcomes need to interpreted 
rather than simply ‘read’ and this undermines their perception as putative answers. 
However, if these questions are rephrased as: ‘how can X be problematised?’ and ‘how 
can Y be raised as an issue?’, then I believe that ‘question and answer’ can have 
meaning in relation to studio practice. 
 
This brings us to the second characteristic: the contextualising issue of why it is 
important that these particular questions should be answered or problems explored. 
This is another stumbling block, particularly for the Romantic notion of the practitioner 
whose aim is the expression of the self. We need to differentiate between activities that 
are to do with the personal development of the practitioner and his or her work, and 
activities that are significant for others in the field. It is only an activity that is 
significant for others that can supply a suitable rationale for why it should be 
undertaken. Personal development docs not make a contribution to the ‘advancement of 
knowledge, understanding and insight’, except in the most parochial sense, i.e. my 
advancement. A counter-argument might be that only through personal development will 
one be able to produce novel artefacts that will in turn make such a contribution. 
However, for these novel artefacts to have this effect the practitioner will have to 
broaden the issue to include the above characteristics and so we can regard personal 
development as a precursor to research rather than research per se. 
 
Anticipating whether an activity will be significant for others is not a matter of 
clairvoyance. Part of the process of identifying the context involves finding out ‘what 
other research is being or has been conducted in this area’. Making a further 
contribution would therefore be significant to at least this group of co-researchers. 
Moreover, there may be an educational, theoretical, critical, or practical context for 
which there is an audience who should also find the outcomes significant. Note that 
the mode is obligatory: ‘should’ or ‘ought to’ find the outcomes significant. The task of 
identifying ‘why it is important that these particular questions should be answered or 
problems explored’, and for whom, cannot be answered by saying that this group will 
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find the outcomes significant, but by supplying an argument that shows that they ought to 
find it significant. 
There is one further matter concerning the audience and that is its size. Many researchers 
have the idealistic notion that to be worthy of the name, research must have a large impact. 
Indeed, in the USA, research publications are assessed in terms of the relative importance 
or impact-rating of journals and the number of times an item is cited by another researcher. 
We have a similar notion in art and design, rating the value of an exhibition in MoMA3 
higher than an exhibition in the local library. Part of this assumed value is the rigour of the 
selection process. We do not value the latter because its lesser impact is a product of the 
weaker selection process and the smaller audience size. A useful question that may be 
asked in order to ensure that a research project meets the ‘why’ characteristic of the 
contextual question is ‘who is the target audience?’ Answering this question identifies the 
number and location of the audience and facilitates targeting the outcomes of the research 
in the appropriate exhibitions, journals, etc. 
The issue of the dissemination of the outcomes is also a characteristic of research. If we 
believe that artefacts have the capacity to disseminate the ‘knowledge, understanding and 
insights in this area’, then we have a tacit notion of the embodiment of knowledge in 
objects. But we should first be sceptical and ask ‘can objects embody knowledge, and if 
so, how?’ Since this capacity of artefacts to embody knowledge is problematised in this 
paper, I propose that as a research method we examine the embodiment of knowledge in 
museum studies, and then consider whether this case study is transferable to art and design 
research. 
All of the knowledge that we have of pre-literate societies comes from the interpretation of 
archaeological artefacts that have survived. However, key aspects of the argument are 
speculative. Let me take as an example the cave paintings at Lascaux. Opinion is divided 
about whether the paintings show a hunting expedition or represent a ritual activity in which 
animals are slaughtered iconically and symbolically as an auspicious prelude to the actual 
hunt. The reason that this important distinction cannot be reliably made is because the 
images do not embody information about their use, i.e. whether it is depictive or symbolic. 
This is not a problem confined to objects of great antiquity. For example, there is little 
material difference between a pair of chop-sticks and a pair of knitting-needles except the 
cultures in which they are found and the way in which they are used. This is even more 
apparent if one considers that there is nothing about their physical form that prevents 
them being exchanged and the one used for the purpose of the other. 
 
Let us consider another more complex example. The Panathenaic frieze depicts a 
quadrennial procession through Athens to the Acropolis in the fifth century BC. The frieze 
originally adorned the Parthenon where its reception in the view of ancient Athenians 
cannot be exactly known. When Lord Elgin removed part of this frieze to London at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century their meaning changed. As a ‘souvenir of the Grand 
Tour’ they became the subject of aesthetic appreciation and were displayed accordingly for 
the benefit of connoisseurs. In the twentieth century the so-called Elgin marbles became 
the subject of post-colonial arguments about the ownership of cultural artefacts and their 
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appropriation. Issues of colonialism came to be seen as embodied in these marbles in a 
way that was not previously apparent. What then is embodied in the frieze per se? The 
fact that these different interpretations have come about with the passage of time suggests 
that while there might be intrinsic qualities to the frieze put there by Phidias, some of the 
meanings are extrinsic, being projected onto them through the culture or the way in which 
they are exhibited. This is a product of the physical properties that objects possess, and 
the way in which we classify them and apply labels, e.g. this is illustrative, this is beautiful, 
this is stolen. 
We should be familiar with the way in which our classification of objects affects our 
understanding of them, and the knowledge that they embody. Foucault, in The Order of 
Things4 and The Archaeology of Knowledge5, sustained a critique against our assumption 
that there are natural or obvious categories of objects in the world. Problematising 
relationships and questioning implicit assumptions is a common activity in research. The 
whole notion of Foucault’s ‘epistemes’, or indeed Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shifts’6, involves a 
change not in the nature of the external world, but in the perceived relationships of its 
parts, or the changing belief that some elements are more significant than others. 
Arguments and assumptions that are raised as a consequence of the analysis of objects 
must, post-Foucault, also include an account of the classificatory approach towards objects 
that allows that argument to be sustained. 
 
The fact that objects can be included in an infinite number of different taxonomies shows 
that their rationale for inclusion or exclusion is not embodied in the objects themselves. 
This is one reason why one cannot have a research outcome that consists solely of artefacts, 
e.g. paintings, because the relationships between the paintings themselves, and between the 
paintings and other artefacts or activities in the world, are not intrinsic to the objects. This 
embodiment is what Wollheim7 calls the ‘physical-object’ hypothesis, which he refutes 
partly on the grounds of projecting interpretative values: his key notion of ‘seeing-in’. 
The physical-object hypothesis is implicit in exhibitions where objects are left to speak for 
themselves. Vergo8 differentiates between these ‘aesthetic’ exhibitions and ‘contextual’ 
exhibitions. The former have little additional information other than the objects, and the 
process of understanding them is largely experiential. In the latter the objects are 
complementary to the ‘informative, comparative and explicatory’ material. Vergo is critical 
of the aesthetic view wherein objects putatively embody knowledge, not least because 
viewers may not share the same social and cultural background on which the interpretation 
of the objects depends. More importantly, what one knows contextually about the object, or 
what one is told, affects one’s reading or interpretation of the object, e.g. this is valuable, 
this is poisonous, this is a fake, etc. Being told nothing is not a neutral stance, but simply 
allows the viewer to project his or her prejudices onto the object. In aesthetic exhibitions 
the author therefore has no control over the object’s reception. If the aim of research is to 
communicate knowledge or understanding then reception cannot be an uncontrolled process. 
                                                 
4 Foucault, M. (1974a [1966]). The Order of Things, Tavistock Press London. 
5 Foucault, M. (1974b [1969]). The Archaeology of Knowledge, Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith, 
Tavistock Press London 
6 Kuhn, T. (1970(1962]) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2"d Edition, University of Chicago Press, 
London. 
7 Wollheim, R. (1980 [ 1968]) Art and its Objects, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, London, 
p.4 
8 Vergo, P. (ed.) (1989) The New Museology Reaktion Books, London, p. 48 
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This notion of projecting values and altering the passive notion of seeing into the active 
notion of interpretation, has a long history, e.g. Wollheim’s concept of ‘seeing-in’9 and 
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’10 . Coupled with the thirty years that have been 
available to appreciate Foucault’s arguments against natural taxonomies, it should hardly 
need emphasising that the process of visual communication and interpretation cannot rely 
upon objects alone11 it is mentioned here because there is still a rump of practitioners 
who advocate the ‘aesthetic’ position but who, perhaps as a consequence of their beliefs, 
have failed to provide a satisfactory counter-argument. 
 
The interim conclusion I would like to draw from the above observations is that our reception of 
objects depends on a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic aspects. Interpretation is an 
intentional act, in the phenomenological sense of actively creating a perception. It is not 
always clear which aspect is at work at any one time, and novel interpretations often draw 
attention to aspects that are embodied or aspects that are projected about which we were not 
previously aware. For example, the colonial attitudes we now see as implicit in the 1816 
London exhibition of the so-called Elgin marbles were not apparent to the nineteenth century 
audience celebrating their rescue from destruction by the Ottomans. 
 
There is another observation that we can draw from the new museology. It is a greater 
awareness of the effect that the exhibition venue and the juxtaposition of objects and 
contextualising material has on our interpretation of artefacts. Our interpretation can be 
actively manipulated by the way in which objects are displayed. Indeed the whole notion of 
display then becomes problematic because ‘non-display’ can be seen as a particular 
intervention. How can we differentiate between the elements of our interpretation, which are 
determined by the juxtaposition and presentation of the artefact in relation to others, and those 
aspects that are embodied in the artefact itself? What is this phenomenology of objects? 
 
For the purposes of this paper I do not think I need to argue that there is no embodiment of 
knowledge in artefacts. It is sufficient to show that the context affects our reading of the object 
in order to demonstrate that objects alone cannot embody knowledge. This situation is 
comparable to the meaning of individual words. Although most of us have been taught that one 
way to approach an essay question is to seek the dictionary definitions of key terms in the 
question, we are also familiar with the feelings of dissatisfaction that arise from these 
isolated definitions. Words have meanings in the context of sentences, alongside other words, 
and in social contexts in which utterances are accompanied by actions. So it is that individual 
objects devoid of context become more-or-less devoid of meaning. Likewise, as they 
become contextualised they become more-or-less meaningful. Furthermore, we are aware 
that the interpretation of words and of works of literature changes over time owing to changes 
in the intertextual context. For example, in 1920 James Joyce’s Ulysses was denounced as 
‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent and disgusting’ by the New York Society for the 
Suppression of Vice, but by 1941 it was hailed by Levin as ‘a novel to end all novels’12. This 
shows that words or texts do not have single unalterable meanings any more than do artefacts. 
This forms a counter-argument to those who object to the outcomes of art and design research 
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being a combination of artefacts and words/texts on the grounds that it gives words/texts 
primacy over artefacts: the so-called ‘heresy of paraphrase’13. On the contrary, it is the particular 
combination of artefacts and words/texts that gives efficacy to the communication. Neither 
artefacts alone nor words/texts alone would be sufficient. What is required is the combination 
of artefact [painting, design, poem, dance, etc] and a critical exegesis that describes how it 
advances knowledge, understanding and insight. 
 
What is the consequence of this argument for the role of the artefact in research? We have seen 
that the object cannot be relied upon to communicate in isolation. It may be that several objects 
in juxtaposition can create a situation in which meanings are constructed and 
communicated, but in such cases it becomes part of the research question to account for 
how such configurations can be manipulated so as to communicate the outcome. This 
necessitates the unpacking of the way in which these objects operate and in turn 
generates contextual material. This contextualising is most likely to be expressed in 
words/texts although I am open to persuasion that it can be done in another medium. 
What is essential is not a particular medium but a particular content, i.e. it must step 
outside the outcomes of the research and explicate the way in which the research 
embodies its ‘contribution... to the advancement of knowledge, understanding and 
insight.’ 
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